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A "Dutch Uncle" Talk on Foreign Trade
by Murray L. Weidenbaum
Baseball is traditionally the national pastime, but in Washington in recent months, the
most popular activity seems to be "Japan
bashing." As the U.S. trade deficit heads for an
all-time high, senators and representatives are
tripping over themselves to blame the Japanese for this country's trade woes.
Nor is this scapegoating limited to the
nation's capital. Some of my conversations
with business and labor leaders whose companies are hard hit by imports remind me of
the gripes of students who cut class, do not do
the homework, and then complain when you
give them a low grade. Unfortunately, the
parallel is very appropriate; so much so, that
our political and business leaders could benefit
from the same type of response that I give those
students-namely, a friendly "dutch uncle"
talk.
The absenteeism rate in key U.S. industries
hit by imports is several times that of Japan.
Our labor turnover rate is much higher. Our
quality is often poorer-for example, as
measured by U.S. products' failure to meet
minimum standards of production.
One large U.S. company that is losing its
share of world markets still has to pay a bonus
each time a worker puts in a full week. That is
like my having to give an apple to each student
who shows up for class on time. The sad truth
is that many industries in the United States

Dr. Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University
Professor and Dire~tor of the Center for the Study of
American Business at Washington University in St. Louis.
This essay is based on a lecture Dr. Weidenbaum gave to
the Foundation for American Communications at the Keystone Institute.

still match low productivity with rising labor
costs. We cannot blame that problem on
foreigners.
Erecting additional trade barriers is not the
answer. I said additional because our hands are
certainly not clean when it comes to open trade.
We have erected our share of obstacles to
imports. We may have convenient memories.
But I speak from my own government experience when I assure you that foreign business
executives can cite chapter and verse on U.S.
trade restrictions.

Even if Japan did not trade with the United
States at all, we would still be suffering
record-setting trade deficits . .. We must
be doing something basically wrong.
Despite the lip service that is so often paid
to the virtues of free trade, there is great danger
that the United States is taking the lead in the
new rush toward protectionism. Public policy
debates are now dominated by one-sided, selfserving views of international trade. Everyone
wants open markets and free trade overseas. We
all know how urgent it is to eliminate foreign
barriers to our exports. But we rarely even
acknowledge United States' barriers to foreign
exports.
The tendency to focus on Japan as the source
of our foreign trade problems is growing. It is
true that Japan maintains an intricate variety
of obstacles to imports that compete with its
own products-and its government only
reduces those obstacles in response to constant
pressure from the U.S. Furthermore, our trade
deficit with J apan-$33 billion last year-is far
greater than that with any other country. In
fact, trade with Japan accounted for nearly onethird of our entire merchandise deficit in 1984.
Yet we must face the fact that, even if Japan
did not trade with the United States at all,
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we would still be suffering a painful and historically high excess of imports over exports.
Without Japan, our total 1984 trade deficit
would have been $69 billion-$11 billion
more than the previous year's record-breaking
performance.
Let me cite just a few other examples of our
country's trade relationships. Our traditional
export surplus with Western Europe has turned
into a trade deficit ($13 billion in 1984). Our
trade accounts with Canada and Mexico are
also in the red-$20 billion and $6 billion
respectively last year. In fact, the United States
has a trade deficit with almost every nation in
the non-Communist world and has had such
deficits for some years.
Hence, it is silly to keep saying that everyone
is out of step except us. We in the United States
must be doing something basically wrong. If we
are going to bring our imports and exports into
balance, we need to reexamine our country's
foreign trade and other economic policies,
avoiding any preconceptions.

U.S. Barriers to Imports
It would help to clear the air if we would
acknowledge that not all of our actions are on
the side of the angels. We have created many
obstacles to inhibit imports into the United
States. Let us examine a few.

"Buy American" statutes give preference to
domestic producers in federal, state, and local
government procurement. By law, most purchases under the program of aid to mass transit
must use American materials and products.
Also, American flag vessels must be used to
ship at least one-half of the gross tonnage of all
commodities financed with U.S. foreign aid
money.
3

The Federal Government's Jones Act is the
opposite of keeping up with the Joneses. It
prohibits foreign ships from engaging in commerce between American ports. This law effectively bars competition in U.S. domestic marine
transport. The perverse effects of such laws are
much greater than you might expect. Because
domestic timber from Oregon that is sold in
Southern California must be shipped in highcost U.S. vessels, at times Canadian lumber
transported by Japanese flag vessels has undersold domestic timber in that major west coast
market. In such cases, both the American merchant marine and the American timber industry suffer damage. Foreigners then become the
unintended beneficiaries of these backfiring
attempts to subsidize the American merchant
marine.
Various agricultural laws limit imports of
products such as sugar, beef, dairy produce,
and mandarin oranges. Other laws and international agreements limit the amount of steel and
textiles that can come into our country. From
time to time, we have imposed quotas on shoes
and autos. The restriction on Japanese cars was
informal, but no less binding.
We all know that our average tariff rates are
low. Yes, they are almost as low as Japan's. Of
course, we do levy high tariffs on some items.
Tariffs on textiles average 20 percent. Duties on
fruit juices are over 27 percent-even clothespins are hit with a 17 percent levy. As a matter
of fact, the proportion of imports covered by
tariffs is growing. In 1950, the United States
allowed 54 percent of all imports to enter dutyfree. Despite all of our talk about being the only
country that practices free trade, by 1981 only
30 percent of our imports were allowed in without paying a tariff.
Moreover, numerous non tariff barriers, often
of a regulatory nature, are imposed by federal,
state, county, and municipal governments.
Local building codes are a popular device to
keep out foreign competitors.
4

U.S. Barriers to Exports

We must also acknowledge the great extent
to which our government has erected obstacles
to our own exports. These are self-inflicted
wounds. It makes us a laughing stock overseas
when we urge other countries to lower their
barriers to our exports while we ourselves
make it more difficult for our exporters.
Approximately 10 percent of our exports is now
subject to these types of barriers.
Numerous domestic statutes and regulations
limit our exports. One law prohibits the export
of oil from North Slope fields in Alaska.
Another bans timber exports from federal
lands west of the lOOth meridian. When restrictions get that specific, you can detect the rich
aroma of special interest pressures.

Export controls call into question the
reliability of the United States as a supplier.
In addition, the Export Administration Act
provides for controls on exports of goods and
technology to protect national security. That
sounds fine. But, in practice, the law mandates
controls over a great variety of products,
including unprocessed red cedar and-my
favorite-horses exported by sea.
In 1980 the Export Administration Act was
employed to embargo grain shipments to the
Soviet Union. It was invoked again in 1981 and
1982 to carry out the ban against U.S. firms participating in the construction of the natural-gas
pipeline between the U.S.S.R. and Western
Europe.
Furthermore, export controls do more than
limit U.S. international trade for the time they
are imposed. These restrictions also call into
question the reliability of the United States as
a supplier of products to other countries, which
therefore are likely to develop alternative
sources.
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A clear example is soybeans-hardly a
strategic item. The purpose of the 1974
embargo of soybean exports was merely to contain a short term increase in domestic prices.
However, the main effect of the embargo was
to induce Japan to turn to other producing
countries, particularly Brazil. Japan proceeded
to invest in that country to develop alternatives
to U.S. production, thus effectively and permanently reducing our share of the world soybean market.
The United States also conducts a great variety of domestic regulatory activities that impose costly burdens on American manufacturers. In many cases, foreign producers are not
subject to similar burdens in their home country. For example, a comparison of U.S. environmental regulatory policy with that of the
United Kingdom concluded that our government's approach has been relatively insensitive
to the objectives and unresponsive to the objections of private enterprise, and that our regulatory regime is "more coercive than in any
other industrial democracy."
In addition to the effects of trade policies
themselves, the strong foreign exchange value
of the dollar makes it extremely difficult for
American companies to compete in world
markets. Many factors influence the strength of
a nation's currency. But our extraordinarily
high real interest rates are very important. In
turn, the large budget deficits are a key influence on those rates-and we cannot blame the
deficits on "foreign devils:· They have a madein-America label.

the way for a return to the trade wars of the
1930s which exacerbated the Great Depression.

The Pressures for Protectionism

How should we respond to the foreign trade
challenge? The first step is to understand why
protectionism is popular. It is a means by which
small, well-organized groups use the political
process to their advantage. The benefits are
received by the protected industries, while
some costs are shifted to other companies who
buy from the protected industries. Ultimately,
most of the costs are borne by consumers in the
form of higher prices. Thus, protectionism can
be viewed as a hidden tax on the consumer. A
study at our Center for the Study of American
Business at Washington University estimated
that hidden tax. In 1980, it came to more than
$58 billion or $255 for each American
consumer.
Like so many sales taxes, those born of protectionism are unfair. For example, "voluntary"
quotas on imports of footwear served as a
regressive tax whereby low-income consumers
were harder hit than high-income consumers.
The Reagan Administration eliminated these
footwear quotas in 1981, but pressure now
mounts to restore them.
It is fascinating to note that the consumer
stake in free trade is as striking in Japan as in
the United States. The following is a letter to the
editor of the Mainichi Daily News written by a
Tokyo housewife:

By no means is the United States the only
nation with trade barriers. Every nation has
them and they continue to grow. However, the
concerns of both our manufacturers and the
consuming public will be far better served by
responding to the underlying problems that
generate pressures for protectionism. The
answer surely is not to retaliate and thus open

Many of us city wives are now fed up with having to pay as much as 500 yen to 700 yen for 100
grams of beef because the government keeps
restrictions on its import. Husbands are asked to
buy beef for omiyage (souvenirs) at American or
Australian airports on their way home to bring
back to their families because beef is much
cheaper in those countries. Oranges and grape-
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fruit can also be much cheaper if only our government liberalizes its imports.
The government says it cannot lift the restrictions because the Japanese farmers should be protected. But the Japanese farmers are now the most
privileged people. They are paying much less tax
than salaried people in the cities. Some of them
are even paid for not growing rice in their paddy
fields. The farmers are much better off in politics
because rural senkyo-ku (constituencies) elect
more Diet members than city senkyo-ku per
population. Sometimes a city Diet member represents four times as many electors as a rural MP.
I cannot but suspect that politicians and officials are not so patriotic as they claim, and they
seek their own good by spoiling our farmers.
Politicians can retain their seats in the parliament
and get political funds from the farmers' organizations. Bureaucrats can keep key posts in corporations and other bodies which control the import
regulations for their own post-retirement jobs.
Why should we city people support these farmers
(and politicans and bureaucrats) by paying much
more for beef and oranges (and rice, too) than in
other countries?

Protectionist measures are a two-edged
sword. They may reduce imports from abroad,
such as the "successful" effort by the United
States in getting the Common Market to restrict
its exports of steel to us. But our domestic
automobile industry, a major purchaser of
steel, bears the burden of higher costs, which
in turn makes it less competitive. The net effect
is added pressure for more protection.
We have another example in the textile sector. In 1983, domestic producers succeeded in
getting the Federal Government to establish
quotas on imports of textile products from
China. By the way, the Chinese must have
wondered about those "inscrutable" Occidentals, because we have enjoyed a large and rising trade surplus with them. How are they
going to be able to continue being a major
customer of American farm products if we do
not buy their goods?
In any event, the Chinese reacted to our protectionist policy by reducing their imports of
agricultural and chemical products from this
8

country. Once again, the benefits of protection
were gained by one special sector of the
economy and the burden was felt by innocent
bystanders.

In the protectionist game, there are always
winners and losers . .. The main losers are
invariably the consumers in the country
raising barriers to imports.
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In the protectionist game, there are always
winners and losers. Although the list of winners
changes, the main losers are invariably the consumers in the country raising barriers to
imports. Thus, it was the American consumer
and not the Japanese producer who bore the
costs of quotas on imports of Japanese
automobiles in the early 1980s. As "visionary"
economists warned "practical" businessmen,
Japanese auto producers responded to the socalled voluntary agreement to limit their sales
of motor vehicles in the United States by
exporting their more expensive models and
loading them with profitable extras. Japanese
producers achieved record profits from their
sales of automobiles in the United States during the period of the import restraint. While
they exported about 30 percent of their auto
production to this country, they earned approximately one-half of their profits from U.S. sales.
Moreover, the dealers for Toyota, Nissan, etc.,
benefited from the willingness of American
buyers to pay substantially more than the
sticker price (up to $2,000) in order to obtain the
then relatively scarce Japanese product. The
American auto buyers paid about $5 billion a
year more for cars than would have been the
case in the absence of the import restraints.
When we stop to think about it, that is the result
you would expect. Reducing the supply without
changing demand results in higher prices.
Unfortunately, $5 billion is a high price to pay
for economic illiteracy on the part of government policymakers.
9

The Case for Free Trade

We must focus once again on economic fundamentals. In the immortal words of Adam
Smith:

our own resources are allocated. It thereby
yields more growth, higher levels of employment, and an improved living standard here at
home.

Positive Approaches to Foreign Trade Policy

It is the maxim of every prudent ... family,
never to attempt to make at home what it will
cost ... more to make than to buy. The tailor does
not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them
of the shoemaker ... What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarcely be folly
in that of a great kingdom.

Our large trade deficit did not develop overnight, and no panacea will cure the problem
quickly. However, there are five sets of actions
that will help to restore the competitiveness of
American business, at home and abroad.

The arguments in favor of free trade and
against protectionism are supported by a great
deal of historical evidence. During the 1930s,
the United States and many other countries
followed "beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies
which contributed to the worldwide depression. The Smoot-Hawley protectionist tariff
epitomized this approach in the United States.
Unfortunately, memories are short. Some of
our young people think that Smoot-Hawley is
a British rock group.
Subsequent to the disastrous protectionism
of the depression period, our trade policy
shifted to the negotiation of reciprocal trade
agreements. These tariff reductions were
followed by an acceleration in world trade and
economic growth. That was not just coincidence. The United States had similar experiences in the nineteenth century, as did other
countries at other times.

There are two extreme positions on this issue,
both of which I reject. One polar alternative
blames the trade deficit entirely on the budget
deficit, while the other absolves it completely.
Although the linkages are complex and indirect, I do believe that financing a string of $200
billion deficits has pushed up real interest rates
very substantially, and that has attracted large
amounts of foreign capital to help finance the
deficits. That substantial inflow of foreign
money has increased the demand for dollars
and, in turn, has resulted in a major appreciation of the dollar. The high relative value of the
dollar has made it easier for foreign companies
to compete against American companies, both
in our home markets and overseas.
Moreover, reducing the budget deficit is
inherently desirable for purely domestic
reasons. The trend during the 1980s thus far
has been for federal spending to be a rising
share of the GNP. That trend should be reversed. I view deficit reduction as essentially
a task of expenditure control rather than
"revenue enhancement." Given the many lowyield programs that remain embedded in the
federal budget, there is ample opportunity to
make progress on reducing federal spending.

Let us recapitulate the benefits of freer trade:
• Open trade contributes to lowering inflationary
pressures by increasing the supply of goods and
services competing for the consumer's dollar.
Thus, the question of free trade is basically a
consumer issue.
• Open trade minimizes the role of government in
influencing private-sector decisions, thus allowing individuals and business firms to respond
to the needs and pressures of the international
marketplace. Free trade is key to promoting
economic freedom and the private enterprise
system.
• Open trade improves the efficiency with which
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1. Reduce the Budget Deficit

2. Gear Tax Reform to Enhance Productivity
and Competitiveness
It is sad to note that most tax reform proposals to date ignore the repercussions on
international trade. Many of the industries
hardest hit by imports are precisely those
II

whose tax burdens would rise the most under
the modified flat tax proposals submitted
both by members of Congress and the
Administration.
Tax reform is inherently desirable, but it is
not now the highest priority economic issue.
This is simply not the time to elevate the
development of an ideal tax system to the top
of the roster of public issues. Rather, tax policy
needs to continue emphasizing incentives for
the items important to enhancing our international competitiveness-saving, investment,
and research and development.
In pursuing the careful and time-consuming
task of rewriting the Internal Revenue Code, we
should learn from the experiences of the past.
Narrowly-focused tax preferences geared to
one industry or region are ineffective ways of
using the tax structure. Such special-interest
legislation should be avoided. The government
is not good at picking "winners;' particularly
since the political power of old, declining sectors of the economy is usually greater than that
of new, developing sectors of the economy.
What is needed are broad-based incentives
aimed at encouraging saving and investment
generally.

Restraints on the export of strategic goods
should be administered with common sense. It
does not contribute to national security to prevent American companies from selling overseas
items that are readily available from foreign
competitors. We must supplement efforts to
reduce our own trade barriers by continuing to
pressure other nations to open their markets to
our products and services. Japan is off to a late
start in this regard, but its government now
seems to be making a genuine effort to reduce
trade barriers.

4. Reduce U.S. Barriers to U.S. Exports
About one-half of our trade deficit with
Japan could be reduced if Congress rescinded
the bans on the exports of timber and oil.

5. American Business and Labor Must Face the
Challenge of Increasing Productivity
We cannot blame our poor production practices on foreigners. The answer is not to prop
up industries with import restrictions or
government subsidies-or to play King Canute
and try to prevent businesses by law from closing down or "running away." Rather, labor and
management in each company need to face the
challenge of enhancing their competitiveness.
Management must show the way. Cutting
back on the proliferation of staff activities and
layers of executives creates an operating environment in which labor is more likely to accept
changes in needlessly costly factory work rules.
Protectionism is counterproductive since it
lessens the pressure on management and labor
to make the painful but necessary changes that
enhance productivity. We all must acknowledge
the painful fact that foreign competition is the
most effective spur to greater productivity.
On occasion, albeit reluctantly, the necessary
changes are being made. In both Weirton, West
Virginia, and Johnstown, Pennsylvania, unprofitable steel plants were sold to the employees.
What were the results? Faced with economic
disaster and unemployment, tough decisions
were finally made.
Wages and benefits-which were approximately 90 percent above the average for factory
workers-were brought closer to competitive
reality. Layers of management were eliminated.
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3. Renew the Regulatory Reform Effort
The costs of producing goods and services in
the United States can be reduced by launching
another effort to reform government regulation
of business. The elimination of some economic
regulation has reduced the cost of transportation. This is not, however, a reason to dismantle
social regulation. But closer attention to the
tremendous costs imposed by EPA, OSHA, and
other regulatory agencies would help to restore
industrial competitiveness. All regulations
should be subject to a tough benefit-cost test
before they are issued.

Work rules were streamlined. Both plants are
now operating in the black, despite the strong
dollar and powerful foreign competition. Ironically, if the mutual suspicion of labor and
management had been eliminated earlier, the
changes needed to restore competitiveness
could have been made under the original ownership and with much less disruption.
None of these five points is easy to carry out.
But each represents a constructive response to
our trade problems, and a far more economically sound approach than a burst of
protectionism.
The pressures for "protecting" American products against foreign competition are rising.
We as a nation can throw in the towel and erect
more barriers to imports. But we know that doing so will not increase the competitiveness of
our companies, that the consumer will wind up
paying the bill, and that innocent industries
will be hit by the inevitable retaliation of our
trading partners.
Nor, I must admit, is the answer merely
another sermon on the virtues of free trade.
After all, a competitive world is a tough
environment for business to operate in. But the
more productive that our businesses becomeand the lower their costs-the more competitive they will be. Thus, the future of
American industry depends on decisionmakers, in both the public and private sectors,
supporting at least some version of the fivepoint program presented here. The longer they
wait, the more American companies will have
to play catch-up ball.
Fundamentally, the future of American
industry will not be settled by government
directives from Tokyo or Washington-but by
decisions made in business offices and on production floors in Boston, Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, St. Louis, and other major
cities throughout the nation.

14

